We examine how state governments adjusted spending in response to the large temporary increase in federal highway grants under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The mechanism used to apportion ARRA highway grants to states allows us to isolate exogenous changes in these grants. We find that states increased highway spending over 2009 to 2011 more than dollar-for-dollar with the ARRA grants they received. We examine whether rentseeking efforts could help explain this result. We find states with more political contributions from the public-works sector tended to spend more out of their ARRA highway funds than other states.
I. Introduction
Often overlooked in debates about the merits of federal stimulus spending or federal spending in general is the role of subnational governments as "middlemen," propagating shocks in federal spending to the real economy. After all, a significant and growing portion of federal spending in many countries comes in the form of federal transfers to regional governments that actually administer the spending. This is particularly true for stimulus spending. For instance, nearly half of the estimated $550 billion in federal spending from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA or Recovery Act) consisted of grants to state governments.
The composition and effects of fiscal expansions, both in general and as countercyclical tools, depend in large part on what states do with federal grants. 1 On the one hand, grants targeted for a specific purpose such as for highways or education are presumably intended to induce states to increase spending for that purpose. Indeed a large literature has documented the fact that federal grant revenues tend to stimulate higher expenditures by recipient subnational governments to a much greater extent than an increase in state income, a phenomenon known as the "flypaper effect" in the public finance literature.
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The flypaper effect represents a puzzle for standard public finance theory. Federal grants generally are partially or fully fungible, allowing states to simply use the grant revenue to substitute for the state's tax revenue and other own funds that would have funded that spending (Bradford and Oates (1971a, 1971b) ). A priori, this fungeability enables states to use the additional source of revenues for other purposes than those intended by the federal government, such as reducing reducing tax rates or decreasing their net borrowing, a substitution effect often referred to as "crowd-out."
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Because the Recovery Act eased the requirements that states must meet to obtain federal grants, many have argued that crowd-out might have been particularly high in this case and could have greatly reduced the effect of the legislation on overall government spending. In particular, 1 The issue is analogous to how households' marginal propensity to consume determines the effects of federal transfers and income tax cuts to individuals. See, for instance, Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) for an analysis of the income tax rebate of 2001. 2 See Inman (2008) for a recent survey of the literature on the flypaper effect and Hines and Thaler (1995) for an earlier review.
3 While this paper is agnostic on which of these possible uses of federal grants -spending, tax cuts, or saving -has the highest economic multiplier, the choice made by state governments is of critical importance, both to policymakers aiming to achieve the type of fiscal stimulus they intend and to economists seeking to understand the likely effects of fiscal expansions.
mechanisms such as matching requirements that require states to pay a fraction of the costs of a project otherwise financed with federal grants can reduce crowd-out. But these requirements were waived for many types of grants under the ARRA. In particular, federal highway grants typically involve a 20 percent matching requirement, which was waived under the ARRA.
Similarly, requirements that states maintain their own level of funding in order to receive federal funds (known as maintenance-of-effort requirements) are intended to mitigate crowd-out effects of federal grants. But these requirements are difficult to enforce in normal times and likely are much more difficult to enforce in recessions. In particular, during the Great Recession and its recovery, many state governments underestimated the pace at which their fiscal situations were deteriorating, leading to strong pressures to reduce expenditures more than previously planned, especially given balanced budget rules that nearly all states have.
The potential crowd-out of states' own funding by ARRA grants figures importantly in a number of recent studies of the ARRA. Cogan and Taylor (2011) and argue, based on national time series data, that the Recovery Act's grants failed to provide much economic stimulus partly because states appear to have responded to higher federal grants for infrastructure, education, and the like by reducing borrowing, leaving state governments' spending on goods and services nearly unchanged. 4 Conley and Dupor (2013) , in their cross-state analysis of the employment effects of ARRA spending, make a similar argument, emphasizing that crowd-out was likely high under ARRA, particularly in the case of highway spending. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also relied on an assumption of partial crowd-out of state spending in its analysis of the expected fiscal cost of the Recovery Act.
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The concerns are especially relevant for federal highway grants, which Knight (2002) found led to nearly complete crowd-out over the period 1983 to 1997. Moreover, highway spending was roughly flat nationally over the 2008-2011 period, despite the nearly 50 percent increase in announced grant funding in 2009 resulting from the Recovery Act. While it is difficult to infer the effect of higher federal grants on state spending by looking at national time series data alone due to the inability to observe what state spending would have been absent the additional grants, to many the flatness of national spending over this period is prima facie evidence of high crowd out.
In this paper, we address the question of crowd-out of federal grants to states by focusing on ARRA highway grants. In particular, we use cross-state data to examine how state governments adjusted their highway spending in response to the large temporary increase in federal grants under ARRA. We focus on highway grants both because of the a priori reasons mentioned above to suspect crowd-out and because highway grants afford particularly strong identification of their causal effects due to the institutional mechanism determining their cross-state allocation. In particular, our strong identification scheme largely eliminates the concern that the allocation of these federal highway grants was endogenous with respect to voter preferences over public goods, as emphasized by Knight (2002) . More specifically, we follow an instrumental variables (IV) difference-in-differences methodology. The first of the two differences is across time, comparing a given state's highway spending in 2008, the year before the ARRA, to its spending in the years after. By time differencing, we remove any state fixed effects, such as those due to time-invariant state characteristics like density, climate, and political preferences, which could otherwise influence state-government highway spending. The second difference involves comparison across states that received different amounts of highway grants per capita.
Most of the ARRA highway funds were apportioned to states based on long-standing, preexisting formulas. These formulas are based on road factors, such as the number of lane miles in a state or a state's contribution to the Highway Trust Fund, which are known with a three-year delay, thus making it quite unlikely that current (post-ARRA) economic activity in a given state could have affected the distribution of these formula-based funds. Yet, a small portion of the ARRA highway funds were distributed outside the formula mechanism, either by competitive grant programs (such as Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) discretionary grants) or at the discretion of the Department of Transportation. Therefore, it is possible that these funds, and thus total ARRA highway funding, could be endogenous with respect to post-ARRA state economic activity.
To insure against the endogeneity concern that apportionment of highway grants to states may be correlated with the before/after-ARRA change in state highway spending, we use instrumental variables that exploit the formula-based mechanism by which most highway grant funding was distributed under ARRA. Both to expedite the distribution of ARRA highway grants to states and to insulate (as much as possible) the White House and Congress from criticism that grants were distributed based on political considerations, Congress apportioned the majority of those funds using the pre-existing formulas mentioned above. We thus use road-related factors that go into these formulas as instruments for the amount of ARRA highway funds received by states.
We also construct an alternative instrument based on one of the first proposed maps for the national interstate highway system. Specifically, we obtained data on the number of proposed interregional highway miles in each state from the 1944 highway system recommendation put forth by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's National Interregional Highway Committee (NIHC).
This plan became the basis for subsequent highway system proposals which culminated with the 1956 Interstate Highway Act. Because the cross-state distribution of miles in this original 1944
proposal is highly correlated with the distribution of highway miles (and other road factors) today, this instrument is a remarkably strong predictor of the cross-state distribution of ARRA highway grants some 60 years later.
Our results indicate that ARRA highway grants did in fact lead to higher state- ARRA grants and pre-ARRA state highway spending, (2) the ARRA grants appear to have had a large causal impact on state highway spending starting in 2009 and persisting through 2012, and (3) the impact was essentially gone by 2013. In particular, we estimate that each dollar of ARRA grants led to around $0.80 higher state highway spending in the first full year after the grants (2010) and a cumulative impact through 2012 of between 2 and 3 dollars per dollar of grants. In other words, the ARRA highway grants led to crowding-in of states' own funding for highways, perhaps due to complementarities between road projects that are eligible for federal reimbursement and those that are not.
These results are extremely robust and hold across a variety of specifications, including across our alternative instruments and including a wide variety of conditioning variables. We also perform several falsification tests. In particular, we show that the ARRA highway grants have no significant relationship with state highway spending in previous economic recoveries, with state highway spending in the year leading up to ARRA, nor with non-highway state government spending such as on education.
In addition, we document that that the higher state highway spending resulted in employment increases in the sector most directly affected by highway expenditures, the road construction sector. In particular, our estimates for 2010 imply that each $1 million of ARRA highway grants received by a state resulted in approximately 2 additional road construction jobs.
Given that ARRA highway grants totaled about $25 billion nationally, this implies a national effect of roughly 50,000 jobs, which is equivalent to a 16% increase in road construction employment from September 2008.
In our analysis, we pay particular attention to the timing of federal highway grants and show that our results are also robust to using different accounting measures with different time lags (i.e., apportionments versus obligations). This is particularly important since, depending on the timing, some of these measures can be anticipated, which can alter the estimated effects on state-government spending (see, Ramey (2011) and Leduc and Wilson (2013) ). 6 In particular, federal grant apportionments to states are known first and then obligated by the states to finance particular projects. However, states are not reimbursed by the federal government until the projects are completed, and then the federal payments show up as outlays. Hence, in our empirical analysis we measure ARRA grants using either apportionments or obligations, which precede or are concurrent with the roadwork they fund. Importantly, our estimated effect of roughly dollar-for-dollar spending from grants in 2010 holds whether we measure ARRA highway grants using data on apportionments or obligations.
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Our evidence of a strong effect of ARRA highway grants on highway spending is particularly striking given that states generally faced no requirement under ARRA to match any fraction of highway projects' costs, making the funds fully fungible. Our results are also surprising given that Knight (2002) found nearly perfect crowd-out (i.e., no flypaper effect) for highway grants over the [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] period. Yet our findings are consistent with a number of previous studies that documented a strong flypaper effect for many other types of grants. 8 The first part of the paper presents a brief review of recent evidence on the flypaper effect.
To shed additional light on the mechanism underlying our results, we investigate the role of rent-seeking efforts by special interest groups. Studying the 1998 settlement with the tobacco industry, Singhal (2008) Our paper also complements the recent empirical work on the effects of ARRA on economic activity. In general, this literature has documented important employment effects from ARRA spending using employment variation across time and states, with the estimates differing somewhat across studies (see, for instance, Wilson (2012) , Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) , and Conley and Dupor (2013) ). The results of this paper suggest a possible transmission channel for this effect that would operate through increases in state spending. 9 However, we acknowledge that these results may not generalize to all other types of grants. For other types, the transmission channel could operate through other channels, for instance via lower state taxes than would be the case absent the additional federal grants. In addition, by documenting the degree of crowd-out during a deep recession when state governments are under acute budgetary pressures, our paper fills an important gap in the public finance literature on the flypaper effect. One exception is the work of Gramlich (1978 Gramlich ( , 1979 , which examines the effects of different grants in the 1977 economic stimulus program using an estimated model of state and local governments. 8 For recent evidence across different spending categories, see Baicker (2001) , Gordon (2004) , Evans and Owens (2005) , Singhal (2008) , Dahlberg et al. (2008), and Feiveson (2011) . 9 Recent preliminary work by Fisher and Wassmer (2013) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we first discuss some recent evidence on the flypaper effect, emphasizing work that paid particular attention to the potential endogeneity of grants. We then discuss the importance of grants in the 2009
Recovery Act and the particular requirements attached to the distribution of highway grants to states. Section IV presents our methodology and identification strategy, while the data are described in Section V. We then present our main results, followed by a battery of robustness exercises and falsification tests. In Section VII, we present suggestive evidence on the role of lobbying of state policymakers (i.e., governors and state legislators) by the private public-works sector in explaining the large flypaper effect. Section VIII concludes.
II. Recent Evidence on the Flypaper Effect: A Brief Review
Arthur Okun coined the term "flypaper effect" to capture the finding that a dollar of exogenous unrestricted intergovernmental grants boosts local government spending significantly more than a dollar of local revenue from residents' income taxes. In other words, money sticks where it hits, since local spending increases where grants are targeted. In contrast, standard theory predicts that a local government's propensity to spend out of these two sources of revenues should be the same, assuming that both grant and tax revenues are fully fungible. Hines and Thaler (1995) provide a review of the earlier evidence contradicting this prediction, while Inman (2008) covers more recent work. In this section, we focus on some recent papers that have paid particular attention to concerns of grant endogeneity.
The importance of controlling for the endogeneity of federal grants when estimating the flypaper effect was highlighted by Knight (2002 
III. Federal Grants and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
The financial crisis in the fall of 2008 and the rapid decline in economic activity that pressures to reduce spending. Third, the penalty for failing to meet the MOE requirements was small. A state that failed to meet the MOE requirement for ARRA highway grants was still eligible to receive all of the originally apportioned funds. However, it would miss out on the FY2011 redistribution of unobligated funds (from other states that did not fully obligate funds within the required time frame), which is small compared to total annual state apportionments.
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Finally, the federal government may be hesitant to fully enforce MOE requirements in a recession because it means decreasing aid to the very states that may need it the most, those unable to maintain spending levels given unexpected declines in economic activity and tax revenues.
Finally, the Recovery Act did not require states to share the cost burden of federally financed highway projects, in contrast to non-ARRA highway grants, which typically call for states to cover 20 percent of the costs. Although the absence of matching requirements lowered the cost to the states of using ARRA highway grants, it also made those grants more fully fungible, making it more likely that the ARRA funds would crowd out state spending. 16 Moreover, even expenditure plans as of February 17 likely would have anticipated a substantial increase in federal highway aid as some legislation like the Recovery Act was widely expected in the weeks leading up to its enactment. 17 At the end of each fiscal year, the federal highway administration reassesses the ability of each state to obligate its apportioned funds and adjusts the limitation on obligations, decreasing it for some states and increasing it for others. For instance, for fiscal year 2010, the GAO (2011) reported that $1.3 billion in obligation limitations were available for redistribution. That was less than 3% of total highway grant obligations in 2010.
The importance of ARRA highway grants relative to non-ARRA grants is shown in Figures 
IV. Methodology
We examine the effects of ARRA highway grants on state highway spending in the years following the adoption of the fiscal stimulus package. We use a difference-in-difference estimator, in which the time difference in state highway spending per capita is taken with respect to 2008, the year immediately preceding the ARRA since our goal is to estimate the effects of the ARRA highway grants on post-ARRA highway spending for years . Thus, we regress on corresponding differences in a set of conditioning variables as well as on the amount of ARRA highway grants per capita received by the state :
(1)
Note that by time differencing, this specification removes the effects that time-invariant state characteristics may have on the level of state highway spending. 18 We also include time fixed effects ( ) to account for common aggregate factors.
18 While time-invariant state characteristics may influence the level of state highway spending (for instance, large states with spread-out populations may tend to spend more per capita on roads), there is little reason to think they should affect the change in state highway spending. In fact, as a robustness check below, we condition on the state's trend (i.e., change) in highway spending per capita over the ten years leading up to ARRA and find that it is Note that is written without a time subscript to reflect the fact that this was essentially a one-time shock. (These highway grants The coefficient of interest is , which capture the yearly effects of highway grants on state government highway spending. Hereafter, we adopt the terminology of the public finance literature and refer to this as the "flypaper effect." More specifically, we estimate both the yearly flypaper effects on highway spending in each post-ARRA year ( ) and the total, or "cumulative", flypaper effect, . Though one can obtain an estimate of the cumulative effect by simply summing over the estimated 's from separate yearly regressions, a more efficient pooled estimator can be derived by combining the yearly specifications (equation
where and . T denotes the year after which the ARRA grants are assumed to no longer have any effect on highway spending. Note that is zero after 2009 when grants are measured using apportionments and is zero after 2010 when they are measured using obligations (see Figures 1-2 ). Thus, the cumulative impact through T represents the full -immediate and delayed -impact of the one-time ARRA grants on highway spending.
Under the hypotheses that the grants are completely fungible and state governments are rational and benevolent, one should expect both the yearly and the cumulative grant effects to be far below one. In particular, if roads are a normal good, then should be equal to roads' share of total state government expenditures, which averaged 0.066 in 2010 (see Table 1 ). An estimate above this level would thus indicate less than perfect crowd-out of a state's own highway funding in response to highway grants.
In Section V, we report both the yearly estimate, , for 2009 through 2013 (as well as for earlier years to test for pre-treatment trends) and the cumulative effect, . In general, because of economically and statistically insignificant and that its inclusion has very little effect on grants' estimated effect on spending.
bureaucratic or institutional lags, it is possible that the initial impact of a one-time grant shock could be very low, consistent with perfect crowd-out, while the cumulative impact over several years could be large. Nonetheless, with a few exceptions (e.g., Gordon 2004), the literature on the flypaper effect has generally focused only on the initial impact.
We report both OLS and IV/GMM results from estimating equations (1) and ( A second endogeneity concern is that, while most ARRA highway grants were distributed according to the pre-existing formulas described earlier, some portion may have been distributed in an endogenous manner. For instance, the Department of Transportation may have been influenced by political pressure to direct funds disproportionately to politically powerful states (particularly if politically powerful states were also states that would have increased road spending relative to other states even in absence of ARRA) or may have wanted to direct funds disproportionately to states perceived to be more in need.
We address these concerns via instrumental variables. We use two alternative sets of (for the half based on STP's formula). Because we are using these factors as instruments for a given year's grants, the three-year lag fortunately further ensures the exogeneity of these factors with respect to a state's current economic activity and its current highway spending decisions. In our baseline specifications, we use just the measures of interstate lane-miles and HTF contributions used in the IM formula as instruments rather than the full dozen or so road factors going into FAHP formulas, to avoid potential biases from using a large number of instruments (see, e.g., Hansen, Hausman, and Newey (2008) ). Using the full set yields little additional firststage power given that the road factors tend to be highly correlated. We also exclude vehiclemiles traveled as an instrument because it is possible that this variable (even with the three-year lag) is correlated with contemporaneous economic activity. That said, the results are quite robust to including additional road factors as instruments. We also report results where we replace these road-related instruments with instruments measuring each state's political power in Congress, both in general and on the key committees in charge of transportation funding. Such instruments were used in Knight's (2002) study of the flypaper effect of highway grants over 1983-1997 as well as by the Feyrer and Sacerdote (2012) study of the employment effects of the ARRA. Consistent with the first-stage results reported in these other studies, we find the Congressional power instruments are only weakly predictive of highway grants, both for ARRA years and earlier. Given that IV estimates based on weak instruments are prone to finite-sample bias (see, e.g., Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)), we prefer the regressions using road-related formula factors or the 1944 highway network as instruments.
Nonetheless, as shown below, we obtain very similar results using these Congressional power instruments.
V. Data
This section describes the data on state government spending, regular federal-aid highway grants, ARRA highway grants, the instruments, and the conditioning variables used to estimate the regressions discussed earlier. Summary statistics for these variables are provided in 
B. Regular (Non-ARRA) Federal-Aid Highway Grants
When referring to federal aid, the term "grants" typically denotes the amount of intergovernmental transfers from the federal government to other levels of government. Yet there are at least three distinct concepts, or measures, of grants that differ importantly in their timing:
Apportionments, Obligations, and Outlays. These concepts are described briefly below; see This misalignment can be thought of as adding measurement error to the true dependent variable, state government spending within the federal fiscal year. As long as this measurement error is uncorrelated with highway grants (for ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions) or with the instruments (for IV regressions), it will not cause any bias and will be reflected in the size of the standard errors. In addition, this concern is alleviated by the fact that we are looking at the effects of the ARRA grants on state highway spending over multiple years. In particular, this misalignment will have minimal effect on the estimated cumulative effect through 2011.
D. Instruments
Data on FHWA apportionment formula factors comes from the Office of Highway Policy
Information's annual Highway Statistic Series publications, In various robustness checks presented later in the paper, we also condition on a lagged 
VI. Results

A. OLS
The results from estimating variations on equation The regression in the first column includes only a constant along with the level of ARRA highway grant apportionments, which were announced in early 2009. Column (2) adds changes in the political preferences variables, and column (3) adds the change in income per capita. The coefficient on grant apportionments is very similar, about 0.7, across the three cases and is highly statistically significant -both relative to zero and relative to the share of highway spending in total spending, which as mentioned earlier averages 0.066. The coefficient in column (1) is not statistically significantly different from one, while the coefficients in columns (2) and (3) are significantly different from one at the 10% level. Column (4) repeats the regression in Column (3) but using ARRA FHWA obligations through September 30, 2010 (the deadline for states to obligate apportioned ARRA funds) as an alternative measure of ARRA highway grants. Using obligations instead of apportionments yields nearly identical results, which is not surprising because states collectively obligated over 98% of apportioned funds (see Table 1 ).
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The estimated cumulative impact of the ARRA highway grants are shown in the bottom row. Compared with the 2010 impact estimate, the cumulative estimate is more sensitive to including conditioning variables, especially the change in income per capita ). In that case, the cumulative impact on state highway spending is estimated to be a little under $2 for each dollar of ARRA grants received.
Recall that a coefficient near zero (i.e., near highway's typical share of total state spending) would indicate that federal grant funds are entirely fungible -treated by states no differently than any other general revenue. In contrast, a coefficient of one implies a perfect flypaper effect, whereby each additional dollar of federal highway grants leads to an additional dollar in highway spending by the state government. A coefficient above one would imply that federal highway grants not only cause a dollar-for-dollar increase in state highway spending but also crowd-in additional highway expenditures by the state. Thus, the OLS results strongly reject complete fungibility and instead indicate a very strong flypaper effect. In fact, the cumulative impact estimates indicate substantial crowding-in.
B. First Stage of IV/GMM -Exogenous Determinants of ARRA Highway Grants
As mentioned earlier, one possible concern about the OLS results is that the distribution among states of some portion of the ARRA highway grants could have been endogenous with respect to post-ARRA highway spending. We address this concern via instrumental variables.
Before presenting the IV/GMM second-stage results, which give estimates of the flypaper effect of ARRA highway grants on state government highway spending, we evaluate the strength and validity of the instruments. We consider the two alternative sets of instruments described in Section III, the first consisting of road-related apportionment formula factors and the second consisting of the 1944 NIHC planned highway miles per capita.
The results of the first-stage regression of ARRA highway grants, for each of the two grants measures, on each set of instruments and conditioning variables are shown in Table 3 .
The regressions in columns (1) and (3) 
C. Second Stage -The Flypaper Effect
The IV/GMM second-stage results from estimating equations ( Starting with Table 4 , we find a very strong flypaper effect in the first full year after ARRA, irrespective of the grants measure used. The point estimates in columns (1) and (2) indicate a flypaper effect of ARRA highway grants on 2010 highway spending of approximately 0.72. In both cases, the effect is statistically very far from zero and from highway's typical share of highway spending (0.066 on average); it is significantly different from one at the 5% level.
The flypaper coefficient is quite precisely estimated in large part because of the very strong firststage fit. The IV estimates are quite similar to the OLS estimates, consistent with our prior that the distribution of ARRA highway grants to states was largely exogenous.
The cumulative impact through 2012, shown in the bottom row, is estimated to be a little over $2, again similar to the OLS estimates (once the change in state income is controlled for) and indicative of substantial crowd-in.
One possible concern with these regressions is that ARRA highway grants could be (see Figure 2) . The estimated IV/GMM coefficients on the difference in total highway grants are broadly similar to those found for ARRA highway grants in that they are economically and statistically far from zero. The coefficients for the 2010 yearly specification in Table 4 range from about 0.6 when using total apportionments to about 0.9 when using total obligations. The estimated cumulative effect varies a bit more across specifications in this case, ranging from about 1.8 based on apportionments to 3.4 based on obligations. Thus, there is no indication that the flypaper effect found for the ARRA highway grants arose because of a failure to account for a flypaper effect for non-ARRA grants.
The results based on using the 1944 NIHC planned miles as instruments are shown in Table 5 . Overall, the results are broadly similar to those of Table 4 , though the estimated flypaper effect of ARRA highway grants, especially the cumulative effect, is somewhat larger.
Specifically, the 2010 impact of the ARRA grants is estimated to be about $0.90 per dollar of grants (columns (1) and (2)), while the cumulative impact is estimated to be about $3.25. As shown in columns (3) and (4), these results are qualitatively robust to using total highway grants.
In all cases, the estimated initial impact (2010) is statistically significantly different from zero but not from one.
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22 Another way to test whether ARRA highway grants do indeed "stick where they hit" is to look at the effect of the ARRA grants on highway spending's share of total state government spending. If ARRA grant funds were treated by states as being completely fungible, they should have no effect of the share of state government spending going to highways. Regressing the 2008-2010 change in highway spending's share of total state government spending on log ARRA grants per capita yields positive and statistically significant coefficients, around 0.007, in both OLS and IV and for both grant measures. A coefficient of 0.007 implies that having 10 percent higher ARRA grants is associated with a 0. This crowd-in could be due to complementarity between highway projects eligible for federal aid and road construction/improvement projects financed with state funds alone. In general, federal aid (including the FHWA's ARRA grants) may be spent by states on additions or improvements to major roads (e.g., highways and urban corridors), bridges, and tunnels, while minor roads (e.g., small rural roads and residential side-streets) must be built and maintained with state funds. Additions or improvements to federally-funded major roads, bridges, and tunnels may increase demand by local residents for new or expanded state-funded roads connecting to those major roads, bridges, and tunnels.
D. Robustness Checks and Falsification Tests
We estimate a number of alternative specifications to assess the robustness of our results and to test alternative explanations. First, we assess the robustness of the results to alternative specifications such as excluding the conditional variables, including additional conditioning variables, or dropping outliers. The results of these robustness checks are shown in the first ten rows of Table 6 Table 5 ).
The regressions underlying the first row include, along with the baseline set of conditioning variables (as in columns 1-2 of (2007)), and hence on recent highway spending growth, this correlation should be captured by this pre-trend. However, the estimated IV coefficients when including this pre-trend are very similar to the baseline results.
The regressions underlying the third and fourth rows of ARRA grant instruments and post-ARRA highway spending to the extent the latter is determined partly by overall economic conditions. We find that the baseline flypaper effect is virtually unchanged by the inclusion of either the level of, or the change in, this index.
Another possible concern is that the level of political preferences (e.g., preferences regarding higher or lower state public spending), as opposed to their change, which already is included in our baseline conditioning variables, could have affected the change in state highway spending and might also be correlated with road factors. The seventh row of the table shows that the baseline results are robust to including the level of political preferences (in addition to their change) as proxied by the political party of the governor, the state house/assembly, and the state senate.
In the eighth row, we assess the importance of the conditioning variables by dropping them from the regressions. Again, the IV coefficient on each measure of ARRA highway grants is virtually unchanged. In the ninth and tenth rows, we consider the sensitivity of the results to outliers. In the ninth row, we include Alaska in the sample, which was dropped from the baseline sample because, given its extreme population sparsity and weather, it is a large outlier in terms of both ARRA highway grants and state highway spending. Including Alaska does not substantively change the estimated flypaper effect. In the tenth column, in addition to Alaska, we drop two other (less extreme) outlier states: Wyoming and North Dakota. Again, dropping these outliers has little effect on the results.
We next assess whether the IV results are robust to using non-road-related variables as instruments. Row 11 of Table 6 shows the coefficient and standard error on ARRA highway grants (for each of the three measures) when we replace the road-related instruments with instruments measuring each state's political power in Congress. The six instruments are: (1) Nonetheless, the second-stage coefficients on ARRA highway grants obtained using these instruments are similar, though less precisely estimated, to those found using the road-related instruments.
In row 12, we reconsider our first instrumental variable approach, which was based on the pre-existing statutory formulas that were used to apportion ARRA highway grants to states.
As discussed in section III, half of the $27.5 billion in ARRA highway grants were apportioned to states in proportion to each state's share of overall Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP) grants in 2008 and the other half according to the pre-existing formula used by the STP, which is a weighted average of a state's federal-aid highway lane-miles (0.25 weight), vehicle-miles traveled (0.40), and contributions to the HTF (0.35). In our baseline specifications, we used both interstate lane-miles and HTF contributions as instruments. However, an alternative approach would be to construct a single instrument using the exact STP apportionment formula. We do this in row 12, which indicates that our results are robust to this alternative approach.
We also consider the sensitivity of our results to an alternative measure of state highway spending. Because our measure includes transfers to local government for roads, it implicitly assumes that local governments in fact use those transfers on roads. In other words, we implicitly assume that the flypaper effect from state transfers to local governments is one. In the penultimate row, we rerun our regression stripping those transfers from the measure of state highway spending. Our findings are robust to this modification.
Lastly, we consider a number of falsification, or placebo, tests to further assess whether the results found thus far do indeed reflect a causal effect of the ARRA highway grants on states'
highway spending decisions. First we test whether the results are unique to highway spending as compared to other types of state government spending. We do so by repeating the baseline regressions, but with the 2008-2010 change in education spending, instead of highway spending, as the dependent variable. Education is the largest category of state government general expenditures. The results of those regressions are shown in the bottom row of Table 6 . Unlike their effect on highway spending, the ARRA highway grants are found to have no significant effect on education spending.
In Table 7 , we replace the 2008-2010 change in highway spending as the dependent variable with earlier, pre-ARRA changes in highway spending. If the positive and significant coefficient found on ARRA highway grants in the baseline regressions does indeed reflect a causal effect on post-ARRA highway spending, then the coefficient should be zero when the dependent variable is pre-ARRA highway spending. We consider three alternative pre-ARRA periods: the period immediately preceding ARRA (2006) (2007) (2008) and the last two recession episodes (1990-1992 and 2001 to 2003) . In each case, we use a two-year change to be as comparable as possible to the baseline 2008-2010 regressions. In all three cases, we find that the coefficient on ARRA grants is insignificantly different from zero, as one would expect.
E. Dynamics of the Flypaper Effect
Thus far, we have focused on documenting the strong flypaper effect of ARRA highway grants in its first full year and cumulatively over the 2009-2012 period. Here we delve deeper into the timing of the flypaper effect by estimating the full dynamic path of highway spending before and after the ARRA grants. Specifically, we estimate equation (1), reproduced here for convenience:
The estimated coefficients , for t > 2008, form the impulse response function to an unanticipated increase in ARRA highway grants. We also estimate for t < 2008 in order to test for pre-treatment trends. We measure ARRA grants using apportionments, which were Table 5 . If one includes 2013, the cumulative impact is slightly larger at about $3.75.
F. Implications for National Highway Spending
In the introduction, we argued that one should not infer that ARRA highway grants crowded out state highway spending based only on the lack of a post-ARRA spike in such spending in the national time series data. Such an inference is problematic since the counterfactual level of highway spending that would have occurred without the ARRA grants is unknown. A simple way to illustrate this point is to use the estimated effects of the ARRA grants on highway spending found in Figure 5 to obtain such a counterfactual. Specifically, we estimate the national counterfactual for a given year by starting with the actual level of national highway spending in that year and then subtracting off the estimated effect of the grants on spending in that year (i.e., the product of the estimated flypaper effect coefficient for that year and the level of ARRA highway grants):
where are the coefficient estimates shown in Figure 5 .
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The results are shown in Figure 6 . The counterfactual path of national highway spending from 2009 to 2011 absent the ARRA grants is shown by the dashed line in Figure 6 ; the actual level of spending, going back to 1979, is shown by the solid line. Actual highway spending was close to flat over 2009 to 2011, despite the fact that state tax revenue, as well as spending in most other categories, fell precipitously. 24 Notice that this flatness also is in stark contrast to the sharp drop in highway spending following the last major recession, in [1981] [1982] . As shown in the figure, our cross-state IV results suggest that, without the ARRA highway grants, state spending on highways following the Great Recession similarly would have fallen dramatically.
23 To assess whether the national effect could be smaller due to diminishing returns, we also estimated specifications that included a squared term for ARRA highway grants. The coefficient on the squared term turned out to be very close to zero and was not statistically significant, indicating no diminishing or increasing returns. 24 Specifically, state tax revenue nationally fell about 15 percent from its peak in 2007 to its trough in 2010.
Specifically, these estimates imply that highway spending would have declined by about 20 percent in the absence of the ARRA grants.
G. Implications for Employment
The strong effect of federal highway grants on state highway spending found above naturally raises the question of whether the grants also impacted employment in related sectors.
In this subsection, we address that question by estimating the same yearly difference-indifference specification (equation (1)), via Instrumental Variables, that we estimated for highway spending but now with employment (relative to its 2008 baseline) as the outcome. We examine the effect of ARRA highway grants on employment in the sector most likely to be directly affected by grant-induced road spending: Highway, Street, and Bridge Construction (NAICS sector 237310). 25 The regressions include the same three political conditioning variables as in earlier regressions but omit the change in income per capita to avoid multicollinearity between that variable (a possible additional outcome of the grants) and the change in employment per capita. Table 8 shows the results of these regressions. Each cell corresponds to a separate regression and gives the coefficient and standard error on ARRA highway grants. Results using apportionments as the measure of ARRA grants are shown in column (1); those using obligations are shown in column (2). We find a positive and significant effect on employment in 2010, while the effect is close to zero in the other years.
The coefficient for 2010 implies that each $1 million of ARRA highway grants received by a state resulted in approximately 2 road construction jobs created or saved. Given that ARRA highway grants totaled about $25 billion nationally, this implies a national effect of roughly 50,000 jobs, which is equivalent to a 16% increase in road construction employment from September 2008.
On its face, this suggests a cost per road construction job created (or saved) of $500,000, but we caution that the cost per job is not an entirely well-defined concept when it comes to evaluating subsets of government stimulus and subsets of employment since it ignores indirect effects. For instance, ARRA highway grants may well have led to additional employment gains in non-construction sectors via indirect spillovers.
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That said, it is worth noting that the recent empirical literature on the ARRA has tended to findsmaller estimates of the aggregate cost per job created (or saved). Examining the impact of total ARRA spending on total nonfarm employment using a cross-state analysis, Wilson (2012) estimate a cost per job created in the first year following the ARRA that ranges between $85,000
and $125,000. In their cross-section study, Feyrer and Sacerdote (2012) estimate a similar cost per job, $107,000, while their time-series estimate is higher at $400,000 per job, whereas the cost per job estimated by Conley and Dupor (2013) is $202,000. In contrast, focusing on the effect of the ARRA emergency Medicaid grants on states total nonfarm employment, Chodorow-Reich et al. (2011) estimate a per job cost of only $26,000. However, Dupor (2013) shows that this finding is sensitive to the set of control variables used in the regression. For instance, the cost estimate rises substantially if one controls for pre-recession house price growth and includes additional controls for pre-ARRA labor market conditions. Nevertheless, these other findings suggest that the ARRA highway grants likely had less 'bang for the buck' compared to other types of spending in the ARRA.
We also note that the increase in employment appears temporary, since the ARRA grants had no effect on the level of road construction employment after 2010 despite the finding that state highway spending was stimulated through 2012. A conjecture is that the types of highway projects done in 2010, which were largely resurfacing and other ready-to-be-implemented ("shovel ready") work, may have been more labor-intensive than the complementary, longerterm projects done in 2011 and 2012.
In sum, we find that the ARRA highway grants not only led to higher state highway spending, but also resulted in sizable, though short-lived, increases in employment in the road construction sector. 26 We also estimated the effect of the ARRA highway grants on total private nonfarm employment. The point estimate suggests a roughly 1.6% increase in total employment through September 2010. However, it is imprecisely estimated, with a p-value around 0.20. The imprecision likely stems from the fact that this regression omits the much larger non-highway ARRA spending that one would expect to also affect total employment. For instance, Wilson (2012) found that total ARRA spending (excluding unemployment insurance extensions) led to employment increases through February 2010 of 1.0% in the total private nonfarm sector and 16.4% in the construction sector, both of which were precisely estimated.
VII. Examining the role of lobbying groups
Our results provide strong evidence that ARRA highway grants had a powerful flypaper effect on state highway spending. In this section, we examine the role of rent-seeking behavior by lobbying groups in influencing how much state governments spent out of the ARRA highway grants.
While different explanations have been proposed for the flypaper effect (see, for instance, the review in Hines and Thaler (1995) and Inman (2008)), Singhal (2008) emphasizes the importance of lobbying groups. As mentioned in Section II, Singhal studyies the 1998 settlement with the tobacco industry andfinds that state spending on tobacco prevention and control programs increased more than six-fold after receiving the windfall payment. To capture rentseeking behavior in a state, she uses whether or not the state filed independent lawsuits prior to the settlement, presumably because of pressure from anti-tobacco lobbying groups in the state.
Using this proxy, she finds that states that filed lawsuits prior to the settlement spent significantly more on tobacco prevention and control programs than states that did not file lawsuits.
The role of rent-seeking appears particularly salient as a driver of the strong flypaper effect of the ARRA highway grants, given widespread anecdotal reports of intense lobbying by public works construction companies, executives, and trade associations. In contrast to Singhal (2008) , we directly investigate this role by compiling state-level campaign contributions to political candidates for statewide office (e.g., governor, lieutenant governor, and state legislators), using data from the National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP). 27 NIMSP staff compile public records on campaign contributions from all fifty states and, among other things, identify the sector of the donor for each contribution, typically based on the donor's employer. The sector may be a specific industry, a specific type of labor union, or a specific cause (e.g., environmental
protection, animal rights, etc.). From these raw contribution-level data, we measure aggregate contributions from both the public works construction sector and the total business sector for each state and each two-year electoral cycle.
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27 Downloaded on 7/31/2013 from http://data.influenceexplorer.com/bulk/. 28 Electoral cycles differ by office and state. For State House seats, an equal number of seats are up for election every two years in all but four states, where they are every four years. For State Senate seats, an equal number of seats are up for election every two years in all but 11 states, where they are every four years. Gubernatorial elections are held every four years (usually even years in between Presidential elections) in all states but two, where they are every two years. Thus, one would expect national contribution levels to be roughly constant (net of secular trends) over electoral cycles except perhaps for a tendency to be higher in gubernatorial election years. 29 Examples of major public works contributors in the raw data are trade associations like "Florida Transportation Builders Association," "California Alliance for Jobs, Rebuild California Committee," and "Transportation Table 9 . The variable G i represents ARRA grants received by state i, as in equation (1), while represents the measure of public works contributions in state i. In the first two regressions/columns, public works contributions is measured in per capita terms; in the last two columns, public works contributions is measured as a share of total business contributions in the state. A positive coefficient on the interaction term would suggest the flypaper effect from ARRA highway grants was greater in states with higher public works contributions.
We find some support for the hypothesis. Public works contributions per capita is positively associated with the marginal effect of ARRA grants on highway spending (i.e., the flypaper effect) for both measures of ARRA grants. The interaction is statistically significant at the 10% level. The point estimates in column (1) The regression estimates in Table 9 also can be used to evaluate the implied "bang for the buck", or return, on lobbying -that is, where is the coefficient on the interaction term and is the coefficient on contributions. 
VIII. Conclusion
31 We also have estimated these specifications using instrumental variables to address the potential concern that public works contributions, and its interaction with ARRA highway grants, may be endogenous in that public works companies/associations may have contributed more to state officials during the 2009-2010 electoral cycle in states where the companies/associations expected higher growth in highway spending between 2008 and 2010 (the dependent variable). We constructed four instruments: (i) a 10-year trailing average of road employment as a share of total nonfarm employment as of 2008, (ii) a 10-year trailing average of (ordinary/non-ARRA) Federal Highway (FHWA) grants as of 2008, (iii) lagged (i.e., 2007-08 electoral cycle) public works contributions to state office candidates, and (iv) the 1944 planned interstate highway miles. The IV point estimates are similar to the OLS results in Table 9 , but they are less precisely estimated. The p-values on the interaction term's effect in the IV estimations range from 0.13 to 0.23. 32 For an analysis of such multi-player games in the legislative process, see Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Baron (1991) . We thank a referee for directing us to this literature. Coefficient and standard error on income per capita are multiplied by 1000 for presentation purposes.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
